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The fact that humans cooperate with nonkin is somethingwe take for granted, but this is an
anomaly in the animal kingdom. Our species’ ability to behave prosocially may be based on
human-unique psychological mechanisms. We argue here that these mechanisms include
the ability to care about the welfare of others (other-regarding concerns), to “feel into”
others (empathy), and to understand, adhere to, and enforce social norms (normativity). We
consider how these motivational, emotional, and normative substrates of prosociality
develop in childhood and emerged in our evolutionary history. Moreover, we suggest that
these three mechanisms all serve the critical function of aligning individuals with others:
Empathy and other-regarding concerns align individuals with one another, and norms align
individuals with their group. Such alignment allows us to engage in the kind of large-scale
cooperation seen uniquely in humans.
Keywords: other-regarding concerns, empathy, normativity, altruism, evolution of prosociality, children, great apes
INTRODUCTION
The fact that people are kind to each other is something that most
of us take for granted. We see numerous examples of it daily:
motorists stopping to let pedestrians cross the street, people hold-
ing doors open for others, travelers carrying babies in buggies up
staircases, passersby donating a few coins to charities or homeless
people, colleagues regularly donating blood. More outstanding
examples of prosocial behavior feature regularly in the news, par-
ticularlywhen the helper risks fatal injury to save someone else. Yet,
despite their banality, these behaviors are spectacularly unusual
when compared to other animals. Outsiders in a society of chim-
panzees, for instance, would not expect to receive offers of food
or solicitude; rather, they would be ﬁercely attacked. Even when
well-integrated within a group, simple acts such as food sharing
come only with begging and harassment (Stevens, 2004; Gilby,
2006). That is not to say that chimpanzees and other species do
not engage in mutualistic, and sometimes coordinated, actions
with one another. Social life is, for the most part, peaceful. But the
fact that humans can interact in a peaceful, coordinated way, with
a clear division of labor with unrelated individuals has earned our
species the label (granted, a self-made label) of being ultrasocial
(Szathmáry and Maynard Smith, 1995; Richerson and Boyd, 1998;
Hill et al., 2009).
We see the hallmarks of ultrasociality in our children. They
readily incorporate other children into their activities, they share
with others (though sometimes under duress), they coordinate
their actions with each other, they negotiate meanings, such as
rules of games, and they help unfamiliar individuals achieve their
goals. How does our ability to cooperate with each other emerge
in development and how did it evolve?
In this paper, we address these questions by looking at three
key psychological mechanisms. These are the abilities (a) to care
about their welfare, (b) to feel with others and to understand how
they feel (empathy), and (c) to learn, understand, and enforce
norms. We will address the ontogenetic question by reviewing
the literature on prosocial behavior in children, and the phy-
logenetic question by examining ﬁndings in our closest living
relatives, notably the great apes. The two questions are related:
understanding the phylogenetic history of a trait can inform our
understanding of its development (Hinde, 1966). The role of
empathy in altruism has been discussed before (e.g., Batson, 1991;
Hoffman, 2000; de Waal, 2009), but we expand on this by sug-
gesting that empathy is not enough. The ability to empathize can
equally lead to antisocial behaviors. Something else is needed to
get prosocial behaviors to emerge from empathy. We suggest that
this “something else” is an emotional, possibly innate, sensitivity
to the needs of others coupled with a motivation toward their
welfare. Furthermore, we will argue that norms add enormous
complexity and richness to human prosocial behavior, making
human prosociality and morality unique in the animal kingdom.
We refer to our capacity to respond to the needs of others and to
do so normatively as alignment, both to other individuals (other-
regarding concerns and empathy) and to one’s group (norms).
Studying how alignment emerges through development will bet-
ter enable us to see how the traits constituting it function; looking
at our closest living relatives will inform our understanding of its
evolution.
To explore the nature of alignment, we will ﬁrst discuss
prosocial behavior and show why preferences for outcomes that
beneﬁt others (positive other-regarding preferences) are a neces-
sary feature. The limits of other-regarding concerns in explaining
prosociality will also be considered. We will suggest that posi-
tive other-regarding concerns motivate behavior that is intended
for the improvement of the welfare of others, and discuss the
importance of empathy in aligning emotional states. We will then
discuss the emergence of norms and their importance in shap-
ing other-regarding concerns. Throughout, we will review the
pertinent developmental literature, as well as the comparative
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literature, to highlight how other-regarding concerns, empathy
and a norm psychology could have evolved, as well as how they
emerge ontogenetically. Finally, we will brieﬂy speculate on the
possible role of alignment that allows humans to be as social as
we are.
PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
Prosocial behavior – that is, voluntary behavior that beneﬁts
others – seems to emerge very early in ontogeny, with some
researchers arguing that it is a biological predisposition (Warneken
and Tomasello, 2009a,b). Certainly by 14 months of age, infants
help others in simple instrumental ways, such as by hand-
ing them out-of-reach objects (Warneken and Tomasello, 2007).
During the second year, as children’s cognitive capacities to under-
stand others’ goals and intentions increase, children are able to
help others in a wider variety of tasks and in response to a
wider array of cues (Rheingold and Hay, 1978; Warneken and
Tomasello, 2006; Svetlova et al., 2010). Importantly, early proso-
cial behavior is not limited to completing others’ action goals.
Thus, when 12-month-old infants see an adult searching for
an object that they know the location of, they point to direct
the adult’s attention to it (Liszkowski et al., 2006, 2008). Given
that infants themselves do not gain anything by providing this
information, their informative pointing may be considered a
prosocial act.
Infants also begin to share objects by the end of the ﬁrst
year and their sharing behavior becomes more sophisticated dur-
ing the second year of life (Rheingold et al., 1976; Hay, 1979;
Brownell et al., 2009; Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011). Chil-
dren as young as 3 years of age will share rewards and will do
so with other children as well as adults (Thompson et al., 1997;
Fehr et al., 2008; Moore, 2009; Rochat et al., 2009). Children
at about 2 years of age require explicit communication from
the recipient to elicit sharing, and even this is not sufﬁcient to
prompt much sharing in 18-month-olds (Brownell et al., 2009).
Moreover, there are individual differences in how willing 15-
month-old infants are to share at a cost to themselves (Schmidt
and Sommerville, 2011). Nonetheless, the important ﬁnding is
that young children share at all, since this is not the rational,
self-interested thing to do1. Sharing is a particularly interesting
form of prosociality because it is costly and because it is impor-
tant for the evolution of human societies (e.g., Gurven, 2004).
It is thus valuable to see how this behavior emerges throughout
childhood.
Given the importance of prosocial behavior in humans, the
question arises, how did it evolve? The extant species most closely
related to humans (i.e., chimpanzees and other non-human pri-
mates) do engage in prosocial behaviors. In the wild, they come
to the aid of their allies in ﬁghts (Harcourt and de Waal, 1992),
they console the combatants afterward (de Waal and van Roos-
malen, 1979) and they have been observed adopting orphans
(Boesch et al., 2010). In experimental settings, they help humans
1The suggestion from experimental economics is that people should be rational
maximizers, namely that they should be interested only in outcomes that affect
themselves. Sensitivity to outcomes for others is referred to as an other-regarding
preference. For example, giving up money in a dictator game is a departure from
rational self-interested maximization (Camerer and Thaler, 1995).
and conspeciﬁcs by retrieving out-of-reach objects on request
(Warneken and Tomasello, 2006; Yamamoto et al., 2012), open-
ing doors for conspeciﬁcs trying to access food (Warneken et al.,
2007) and releasing food and non-food items when the recipient
acts on the chain holding the reward or signals to the helper (Melis
et al., 2010).
However, there is not very strong evidence from the ﬁeld for
food sharing in our closest living relatives. In most cases, in chim-
panzees at least, food is shared only under harassment (Stevens,
2004; Gilby, 2006); even mothers will not voluntarily offer novel
foods to their own infants unless the infants beg for them (Ueno
andMatsuzawa,2004). In the lab, chimpanzees donot show apref-
erence for outcomes that beneﬁt their groupmates (Silk et al., 2005;
Jensen et al., 2006;Vonk et al., 2008). In these studies, chimpanzees
were no more likely to choose an option that beneﬁted another
chimpanzee and themselves as well (mutualism) than an option
that only beneﬁted themselves (selﬁshness). Remarkably, therewas
never even a tangible cost, such as giving up some food. Chim-
panzees thus seem to be more focused on their own outcomes, and
in this sense, behave more like the theoretical Homo economicus
(Frank, 1987) than do humans. Even in tasks where two sub-
jects working together can both get food, mutualistic cooperation
breaks down if the food is not easily divisible (Melis et al., 2006)
in contrast to human children who will actively divide rewards
after a collaborative task (Warneken et al., 2011). Whether this
indifference to outcomes for others holds across different experi-
mental paradigms (Horner et al., 2011) or different species (e.g.,
common marmosets; Burkart et al., 2007) is a matter of current
debate.
Evidence for prosociality in other species raises questions of
its own, namely: Are these behaviors similar to and underlain by
the same psychological mechanisms as in humans (homologous,
that is shared by descent), or do they only superﬁcially resemble
human prosocial behavior but are driven by different mechanisms
(analogous – similar by selection pressures)? For example, conso-
lation may be more effective at reducing the stress of the consoler
rather than the consoled individual and can serve to reduce the
likelihood of future attacks (Koski and Sterck, 2007; Koski et al.,
2007). Chimpanzees in captivitymight hand objects back to exper-
imenters due to prior training and theymight remove bolts to open
doors and cause food to drop because doing so is an interesting
distractor or because the begging and signaling from a conspe-
ciﬁc is annoying. Even insects and ﬁsh will engage in prosocial
behavior – both mutualistic and altruistic (Bshary et al., 2006;
Ratnieks and Wenseleers, 2008), and very simple computer pro-
grams can appear prosocial (e.g., “generous” tit-for-tit; Wedekind
and Milinski, 1996). It is therefore important to not assume that
similar looking behaviors are indeed one and the same. Different
underlying causes can lead to similar outcomes (for reviews, see
Jensen, 2012; Jensen and Silk, 2014).
OTHER-REGARDING CONCERNS
It is difﬁcult to infer what psychological processes lay behind a
behavior such as helping, particularly with naturalistic obser-
vations. A single action can have multiple causes. A person
seen carrying a suitcase off a train might be doing so to help
the traveler reach his or her destination, but the goal might be
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to run off with the suitcase once on the platform, to impress
the traveler with the goal of arranging a date, or even out of
spite after the traveler had just struggled to get the suitcase
onto the train. An implicit assumption of other-regarding pref-
erences and other prosocial acts is that they are motivated for
their effect on other individuals (e.g., Warneken and Tomasello,
2008). However, this need not be the case. People can have ulte-
rior motives. Acting out of self-interest can lead to unintended
beneﬁts for others (Adam Smith referred to this as the “invisi-
ble hand” guiding markets; Smith, 1776/2005). Selﬁsh motives
are particularly relevant in mutualistic interactions – both indi-
viduals beneﬁt by working together, but consequences for the
partner can be incidental to the actor’s achieving his or her per-
sonal goals. Altruistic acts (functionally altruistic in terms of
immediate costs and beneﬁts to actor and recipient, not in the
biological use of the term which is measured in ﬁtness; West
et al., 2007; Clavien and Chapuisat, 2013) are typically clearer
demonstrations of actions performed for their effect on another
individual, but even these need not be performed for the beneﬁt
of the recipient. The other individual can be used as a means to
an end. If the end is one’s own happiness (“warm glow” altruism;
Andreoni, 1990), then any beneﬁts to others can be unintended
side-effects. This is hardly a starting point for truly prosocial
behavior.
POSITIVE OTHER-REGARDING CONCERNS
As stated above, prosocial behavior can arise from a variety of
mechanisms and be driven by a range of motivations, but for an
act to be truly prosocial (other-regarding) in the sense that the
intended goal is the beneﬁt to the recipient, then the actor’s moti-
vationwill have to be for the recipient’s welfare (e.g., Batson,1991).
The stance toward the environment that impacts on an individual’s
well-being is a concern (Prinz, 2007). When the stance is toward
the welfare of others, this is an other-regarding concern, and it is
the motivational basis for truly prosocial behavior. There can be
a cognitive component to prosocial behavior, such as recognizing
the goals and desires of others, but there must also be a concern
that has an emotional consequence – a felt response – for the actor
(Nichols, 2004b; Prinz, 2007). Otherwise, there will be no impetus
to act on the other’s behalf. Recognizing that someone is in need
is not sufﬁcient to lead to helping. For example, seeing a homeless
person on the street and recognizing that he needs money does
not guarantee that one will give him any loose change, let alone
invite him to move into one’s home; some additional motivational
force is needed to make one act in a truly prosocial manner. The
felt response can be sensitive to the emotions of others, and these
are called fortunes-of-others emotions (Ortony et al., 1988). If the
emotions are the same as another person’s – e.g., sad for sad-
ness (empathic distress) and happy for happiness (symhedonia) –
then they are aligned. Aligned (or congruent) fortunes-of-others
emotions will motivate action if seeing someone in distress is dis-
tressing and will lead to satisfaction at seeing the welfare of the
other improve. The child will seek to remove the source of distress
– ideally by helping the distressed other – and will be reinforced by
the satisfaction of others. The role of these emotional processes,
notably affective resonance and empathy, in social and prosocial
behavior will be discussed further in the next section.
While children do help others and share with them, they might
not do so out of a concern for their welfare. For instance, they
may do so simply because this is what they have been taught
to do, along with shaking hands with the right hand and eating
with a fork (a point that will be raised in the section on norms).
Recent work has begun to address these alternative possibilities,
at least with regard to instrumental helping. One line of work
shows that young children’s helping behavior is not inﬂuenced by
parental presence or encouragement, and indeed, is undermined
by external material reward, hinting that helping behavior may
be intrinsically rather than extrinsically motivated (Warneken and
Tomasello, 2008, 2013). Of particular importance to the role of
emotions in prosociality, a recent study used physiological mea-
sures (pupil dilation) and found that 2-year-old children are not
motivated primarily by a desire to help a person themselves (and
thus to beneﬁt themselves via reciprocity, an improved reputation
or just an interest in engaging with the task), but rather by a desire
just to see the person be helped, indicating that toddlers’ proso-
cial behavior stems from a genuine concern for the other’s welfare
(Hepach et al., 2012a).
NEGATIVE OTHER-REGARDING CONCERNS
Other-regarding concerns are not always aligned. One can feel
unhappy at the happiness or fortunate circumstances of oth-
ers (jealousy and envy), and happy at their unhappiness or
misfortunes (schadenfreude; Ortony et al., 1988). Misaligned
fortunes-of-others emotions would hardly seem to be ingredients
for prosociality. They can form the basis of negative other-
regarding concerns, inwhich the actor ismotivated to diminish the
welfare of others. Negative other-regarding concerns can also lead
to harming behavior, as in the case of sadists being able to grasp
how their victims feel but deriving pleasure from their suffering.
Negative other-regarding concerns should not be dismissed
simply as the evil twin of positive other-regarding concerns, how-
ever. They might also have a place in prosociality. They can
motivate punishment, or negative reciprocity, in which harm
is returned by harm; this is a powerful disincentive to free-
riders who would otherwise exploit prosocial individuals (Boyd
and Richerson, 1992; Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; Jensen,
2010). In economic experiments such as the public goods game,
cooperation – in terms of contributions to a public good –
declines quickly with repeated rounds, but with the addition
of a punishment option – which is costly for the punisher
but provides a beneﬁt for everyone – cooperation can be sus-
tained at a high level (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Gürerk
et al., 2006). Punishers often feel angry at being cheated (e.g.,
Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007) and
people (men, at least) will show neurological signatures of plea-
sure when seeing someone who cheated them apparently receive
a painful stimulus (Singer et al., 2006). Negative other-regard,
then, can have hedonic value for the punisher, and in the
right circumstances, such as when encountering cheaters and
free-riders, motivate punishment that is costly at the time it is
performed, but can ultimately lead to more prosociality. More
generally, punishment is an important means to enforce norms
and cooperation, a topic that will be addressed in the section on
norms.
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It may be the case that other-regarding concerns – both positive
and negative – motivate social behavior. Negative other-regarding
concerns can be thought of as the spice that accompanies the sugar
in everything nice. Our attention will now turn to the emotional
substrate for positive other-regarding concerns, both because this
has been much more studied in children and because it is of clear
and direct value to prosociality.
EMPATHY
One of the most fundamental sources of prosocial motivation
is thought to be empathy, which is an affective response that
stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s emo-
tional state and is similar to what the other is feeling, and the
related process of empathic concern (or sympathy), which is the
feeling of concern or compassion for the other (Hoffman, 1981;
Eisenberg, 1986; Batson, 1991; Eisenberg et al., 1991). From early
in ontogeny, empathy, and especially empathic concern, have
been extensively shown to lead to prosocial behaviors and away
from antisocial behaviors (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Miller and
Eisenberg, 1988; Hoffman, 2000). To understand the nature and
origins of truly prosocial behavior, therefore, it is imperative to
understand the nature and origins of empathy-related processes.
This is the aim of the next section, in which we will describe
the fundamental components of empathy and empathic concern,
and assess the developmental and comparative evidence for those
components.
AFFECTIVE RESONANCE
From the very beginning of life, humans are deeply tuned to the
affective states of others. Newborn infants mimic others’ facial
expressions and gestures (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977; Haviland
and Lelwica, 1987). They also respond by crying when they hear
another infant indistress butnotwhen theyhear other equally loud
sounds or recordings of their own cries (Simner, 1971; Sagi and
Hoffman, 1976; Dondi et al., 1999). Such automatic and involun-
tary emotional contagion persists through the ﬁrst year (Geangu
et al., 2010). From the very start of life, then, humans are deeply
connected to others’ internal states, suggesting that this capacity is
hard-wired and may be evolutionarily preserved (de Waal, 2008;
Decety, 2011). Indeed, mimicry of facial expressions as well as
emotional contagion are seen not only in human infants but also
in great apes and several other social species (Parr, 2001; Bard,
2007).
Such affective resonance –which is thought to be basedon auto-
matic perception-action processes and themirror neuron system –
aligns individuals’ internal states with those of others and, as such,
is foundational to countless aspects of social life, ranging from
mother-infant bonding, regulating social interactions, and coor-
dinating activities (McDougall, 1908/2003; Blakemore andDecety,
2001; Preston and de Waal, 2002; de Waal, 2008). To take just one
example, if onemonkey in a group sees something dangerous, such
as a snake, he is aroused and produces an alarm call, which pro-
duces arousal in his group members and leads the group to move
away from the source of danger en masse (Cheney and Seyfarth,
1985). Crucially, though, this phenomenon does not constitute
empathy or empathic concern and is not sufﬁcient to motivate
prosocial behavior, as discussed next.
DISTINGUISHING SELF FROM OTHER
When an observer shares the affective state of a target, she expe-
riences a greater or lesser degree of the same or a similar affective
state as the other. When this happens and no other mechanisms
are at work, the observer will not experience the affect as vicar-
iously induced but rather as being her own and rooted in her
own situation, and will thus be motivated to regulate and respond
to her own affective state (e.g., by escaping the situation that is
causing her distress; Batson, 1991; Eisenberg et al., 2006). In such
scenarios, it is unclear what the observer’s motivation would be
to respond to the target’s affective state (unless doing so is the
only way she could reduce her own arousal). For the observer
to identify her affective state as being rooted in the target’s rather
than her own situation, the observer must distinguish herself from
the other and her own internal states from those of the other. This
sense of self as distinct fromothers is considered essential for affec-
tive resonance to become empathic responding (Hoffman, 1976,
2000).
Such self-other distinction is typically tested by mirror self-
recognition (MSR), wherein a small mark is surreptitiously placed
on an individual’s face and the individual’s behavior in front of a
mirror is assessed (Gallup, 1970; Amsterdam, 1972). If the indi-
vidual shows self-directed behavior (e.g., touching the face), she is
thought to have a concept of self as distinct from and in relation
to others (see Moore, 2007, for a discussion). Note, however, that
other authors have questioned this rich interpretation, arguing,
for instance, that MSR indicates an awareness of one’s physical
appearance but not a more conceptual awareness of the self (e.g.,
Suddendorf and Butler, 2013).
In humans, MSR starts by around 18 months of age
(Amsterdam, 1972) and has been shown to coincide with the
beginning of other-directed and appropriate prosocial behavior
(Bischof-Köhler, 1991; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992a). However, some
authors have recently questioned whether the ability to experience
empathy requires the kind of explicit, reﬂective self-knowledge
tested by MSR (Davidov et al., 2013). These authors propose that
a simpler, more implicit form of self-recognition may be sufﬁ-
cient for empathy, and that this form of self-recognition (based on
the infant’s subjective experience of her own sensory perception
and self-generated actions) is present from birth (see also Lewis
and Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Rochat, 2003). The suggestion is that
from the very beginning of life, humans are not only affectively
tuned to others’ states but, with the aid of simple and implicit
social-cognitive tools, are able to empathize with them. This fun-
damental capacity stays with us through development and indeed
throughout our lives. What changes and improves with develop-
ment is the ability to mentalize, as well as the child’s knowledge
about the world, both of which facilitate the child’s ability to help
those in need and respond in more complex situations such as
when a victim is absent or when a victim’s immediate cues are
inconsistent with the general state of the victim (Davidov et al.,
2013).
Support for this proposal comes from recent ﬁndings showing
that infants as young as 8–10 months do show concern for victims
displaying distress, as measured in the infants’ facial expressions,
vocalizations, and gestures (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). Moreover,
while the level of empathic concern does not increase between 8
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and 16 months of age, infants’ “cognitive empathy” (or attempts
to explore and comprehend the others’ distress, akin to a basic
theory of mind) does seem to increase gradually over this time
period (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). Other work has also shown
that when self-understanding is deﬁned more broadly than MSR
(e.g., self-description as seen in the use of own name, use of words
such as “me” and “mine”), it relates positively with the degree of
empathic concern that children as young as 12 months show for a
distressed peer (Nichols et al., 2009).
There is thus some reason to think that empathy could exist
even in the earliest stages of infancy. If correct, this proposal
may have wide-reaching implications. It implies, for instance,
that empathy is a fundamental part of the human make-up. As
such, it also suggests that not only affective resonance but also
empathy may have deeper evolutionary roots than previously
believed. For instance, thus far, the only primate species to reli-
ably show MSR have been the great apes; lesser apes (gibbons)
and monkeys seem to differentiate between their own and another
monkey’s image in the mirror but fail the formal mark test (de
Waal et al., 2005; Suddendorf and Collier-Baker, 2009); this sug-
gests that the capacity for visual self-recognition evolved in a
common ancestor of all great apes after the split from the line
that led to modern lesser apes (Suddendorf and Collier-Baker,
2009; Suddendorf and Butler, 2013). The conclusion from such
ﬁndings has been that this prerequisite for empathy is limited
to the great apes and humans and is thus relatively recent in
our evolutionary history. However, if a more implicit sense of
self exists and can fulﬁll some of the same functions as a more
reﬂective sense of self, then it is possible that many more social
species than previously believed have at least one of the prereq-
uisites for empathy (cf. de Waal, 2008), though this certainly
need not imply that they necessarily have empathy or empathic
concern.
EMPATHY AND EMPATHIC CONCERN
The abilities to experience affective resonance and to discriminate
between self and other are the essential ingredients for empathy,
which is the affective response that stems from an apprehension
or comprehension of another’s emotional state and is similar to
what the other is feeling. However, knowing how another feels
via a mechanism such as empathy may be necessary, but is not
sufﬁcient, for prosocial behavior motivated out of concern for the
welfare of others. This is because knowing how the other feels is
not the same as caring how the other feels. This requires pos-
itive other-regard (as discussed above), which has the powerful
capacity to bring about empathic concern wherein the observer
not only feels as the other feels and identiﬁes the other as the
source of the feeling but also cares what happens to the other
and is therefore motivated to enhance the welfare of the other.
Notably, this means an alignment not only of the observer’s and
target’s affective states but also of their goals and motivations:
Both the observer and the target are invested in and affected by
the target’s welfare and both are thus motivated to improve it
(Hepach et al., 2013; Vaish and Tomasello, 2014). We now have
the ingredients in place for empathic concern (or sympathy),
which provides a fundamental motivational force for prosocial
behavior.
Decades of research show that toddlers and young children
respond with empathic concern toward others and that this
empathic concern motivates prosocial behavior. Typically, infants
see a person (parent or stranger) experience a negative situa-
tion (bumping her knee against a table, for instance) and overtly
showing pain, distress, or sadness. In such situations, infants as
young as 14 months of age show concern in their facial and vocal
expressions and often attempt to alleviate the victim’s distress by
comforting, helping, or sharing with her (Eisenberg et al., 1989;
Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992a,b; Svetlova et al., 2010). Moreover, the
empathic concern that infants and toddlers show in these situ-
ations correlates positively with their prosocial behavior toward
the victim (Hoffman, 1982; Eisenberg and Miller, 1987), indicat-
ing that empathic concern serves prosocial motives from early in
ontogeny. This work provides evidence for an early capacity to
experience empathic concern stemming from affective resonance
whereby children automatically share the victim’s affect, distin-
guish between self and other, and, in conjunction with positive
other-regard, experience empathic concern for her.
Whether empathic concern is present even during the ﬁrst
year (with the aid of implicit self-recognition capacities) is an
open question. As noted earlier, some recent work suggests that
infants as young as 8–10 months show concern for others dis-
playing distress (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011; see also Nichols et al.,
2009). Certainly by the second year, human children experience
other-directed empathic concern and this concern motivates their
prosocial behavior toward those in need.
The story is far less clear when it comes to empathic concern
in the great apes. As discussed above, a sense of self is present in
the great apes, but other-regard may or may not be, making it
difﬁcult to formulate a clear hypothesis about whether empathic
concern could or could not exist in these species. A recent exper-
imental study aimed to directly test whether empathic concern
motivates prosocial behavior in the great apes (Liebal et al., 2014;
based on a similar study with children byVaish et al., 2009). In this
study, subjects saw a conspeciﬁc being either harmed (a human
experimenter stole the conspeciﬁc’s food) or not being harmed
(no food was stolen from the conspeciﬁc). Subsequently, sub-
jects had the opportunity to provide help to the conspeciﬁc in
a new task. The logic was that if subjects experience empathic
concern for a conspeciﬁc who is harmed (versus one who is not
harmed), then this concern should motivate their subsequent
prosocial behavior toward the conspeciﬁc. The results did not
support this hypothesis, as apes helped their conspeciﬁc equally
if he had previously been harmed than if he had previously not
been harmed, suggesting that their prosocial behavior was not
motivated by empathic concern. However, much more work is
needed to rule out alternative explanations. For instance, per-
haps the harm situation was simply not serious enough to elicit
concern in the subjects. Equally, perhaps apes do experience
concern for others but this concern does not necessarily trans-
late into helping behavior of the kind measured in the study;
instead, perhaps apes would be more likely to groom or console
a conspeciﬁc for whom they felt empathic concern (Liebal et al.,
2014).
Empathy has been attributed to numerous other species as well.
For instance, recent studies, in line with decades-old research
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(Church, 1959; Rice and Gainer, 1962), conclude that mice and
rats are empathic because they exhibit heightened pain responses
after seeing conspeciﬁcs in pain (Langford et al., 2006) and altruis-
tically open doors to release conspeciﬁcs trapped in tubes (Bartal
et al., 2011). However, we must be cautious in our interpreta-
tions here because there is no reason to believe that empathic
concern, or even more “primitive” emotional contagion, are
involved. Like rats, ants show releasing behaviors, and there
is nothing to suggest that an emotional mechanism tuned to
the welfare of others is involved there (Nowbahari et al., 2009;
Vasconcelos et al., 2012). Furthermore, even if the rats did expe-
rience emotional contagion, the “helping” rat did not have an
alternative, such as escaping to avoid the distressing stimulus of
a stuck rat, a key element of empathy–altruism studies on adults
(e.g., Batson et al., 1981). Moreover, the helper might simply be
curious, especially given that after the rats have opened the tube
door, they often go inside and explore it, or they might have been
seeking social contact (Silberberg et al., 2014). These issues must
be given special considerationwhen studying animalsmost akin or
familiar to us due to our tendency to anthropomorphically project
human characteristics onto other species (Wynne, 2004; Barrett,
2011).
Overall, then, humans demonstrate empathic concern from
as early as the second year of life and such empathic con-
cern motivates their prosocial behavior toward victims. How-
ever, the jury is still out as to whether empathic concern may
occur even earlier in human ontogeny as well as about whether
it occurs at all in other species, including our closest living
relatives.
BEYOND AFFECTIVE RESONANCE
Our discussion of empathic concern has thus far focused on
empathic concern grounded in the fundamental capacity for
affective resonance. That is, when an observer attends to a
target in pain or distress, he experiences resonant affect that,
with the aid of self-other discrimination and other-regard, can
become empathic concern. But humans (at least) have higher
cognitive capacities that allow us to experience empathic con-
cern even without affective resonance. Perhaps most prominently,
even when we have no perceptual access to a target’s emotional
state, our ability to take others’ perspectives allows us to imag-
ine how the target might be feeling and perhaps experience
empathy as a result. As noted earlier, knowing how another
feels (either through affective resonance or perspective taking)
is not sufﬁcient to elicit concern or prosocial behavior. How-
ever, in conjunction with positive other-regard, imagining or
understanding how another feels can enable us to experience
empathic concern for the other (Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1984;
Eisenberg et al., 1991; Batson et al., 1997; Ruby and Decety,
2004).
Interestingly, even when we do experience affective resonance
in response to overt perceptual cues, we are able to use our con-
textual appraisal abilities to modulate our empathic concern as
appropriate (e.g., Lamm et al., 2007a,b). For instance, if adult par-
ticipants are made to believe that the hands they see in painful
situations have been anesthetized, their empathic concern is signif-
icantly dampened compared to when participants do not believe
the hands are anesthetized (Lamm et al., 2007b)2. Such processes
act as top-down generators and modulators of empathic concern,
adding tremendous scope and ﬂexibility to our empathic sys-
tem by ensuring that we are able to respond empathically – and
thus prosocially – in diverse situations and toward diverse victims
(Hoffman,2000; Decety andLamm,2006; Singer andLamm,2009;
Decety, 2010; Vaish and Warneken, 2012).
Recent work provides evidence for this extended scope and
ﬂexibility even in young children’s empathic concern. One line of
work has explored whether children can experience concern even
in the absence of any perceptual access to a victim’s distress. In one
study, 6-year-old children who observed an adult being harmed
(another adult destroyed her artwork) showed expressions of con-
cern for her even though she did not display any distress (Hobson
et al., 2009). A further study found that even 18- and 25-month-
old children showed greater facial concern for an adult who was
harmed but displayed no distress than for an adult who was not
harmed. Moreover, when the adult subsequently needed help, chil-
dren were more prosocial toward her if they had previously seen
her being harmed than not being harmed, and individual chil-
dren’s concern while seeing the adult being harmed correlated
positively with their subsequent prosocial behavior (Vaish et al.,
2009; see also Vaish et al., 2010b). These studies show that human
empathic concern is multi-determined (evoked in response to sev-
eral types of cues – both emotional and situational) from early in
development.
In a second line of work, researchers have begun examining
whether contextual appraisal plays a role in children’s empathic
concern. In one study, 3-year-old children showed reduced con-
cern and subsequent prosocial behavior toward a “crybaby,” i.e., a
person who was considerably distressed after being very mildly
inconvenienced, than toward a person who was similarly dis-
tressed after being more seriously harmed (Hepach et al., 2012b;
see also Leslie et al., 2006; Chiarella and Poulin-Dubois, 2013).
Thus, young children’s empathic concern is impacted by not only
the presence or absence of distress cues from a person but also the
contextual cues surrounding the distress.
To sum up, top-down processes such as perspective-taking and
contextual appraisal add scope and ﬂexibility to humans’ empathic
concern from an early age (certainly by the middle of the second
year). This allows even young children to, on the one hand, align
their affective states with those of others in a broad array of situa-
tions and in response to various types of cues, and yet, on the other
hand, have the ﬂexibility to modulate their empathic concern so
that they can direct their concern and prosocial behavior toward
those who truly need it. This sophistication in early empathic
concern speaks to the complexity of human social interactions
and the vital role played by empathic concern in allowing for and
regulating such interactions.
2Note that such modulation of empathic concern – and indeed all empathic
concern – additionally requires the ability to regulate one’s emotions, which allows
one to modulate and regulate one’s emotional response as appropriate. We will not
deal with this vast topic here but the interested reader is referred to the theoret-
ical and empirical work of Eisenberg and colleagues (Eisenberg and Fabes, 1990,
1992; Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg et al., 2006; Eisenberg and Eggum, 2009; see also
Koski and Sterck, 2009, for a discussion of the emotion regulation capacities of
chimpanzees).
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Whether empathic concern with such scope and ﬂexibility may
be available to any other species is as yet unknown. Before tack-
ling this question, however, it would seem much more fruitful for
future work to examine whether or not empathic concern through
affective resonance exists in other species. This is because if any
form of empathic concern is likely to exist in other species, we
think it is most likely to be empathic concern that arises out of
affective resonance – given that the foundations for such empathic
concern lie in the automatic, perception–action mechanisms that
all social species share (Preston and de Waal, 2002). As mentioned
above, the ﬁrst experimental test of empathic concern in the great
apes failed to ﬁnd evidence for such empathic concern (Liebal
et al., 2014), but much more work is needed to draw ﬁrm con-
clusions. More multi-determined and ﬂexible forms of empathic
responding require higher cognitive (and emotional regulation)
skills that the great apes may or may not possess (see Call and
Tomasello, 2008; Koski and Sterck, 2009). Our prediction here is
that if any empathic concern exists in species other than humans,
it will be the most fundamental kind – evoked by overt emotional
signals and via affective resonance – and that much more complex
and sophisticated forms of empathic concern may well be unique
to humans.
So far, we have been concerned with alignment on the inter-
personal level, that is, alignment with others through empathy
and empathic concern. Humans also interact on the impersonal
level (e.g., in third-party interactions), that is, they align with their
group through social norms; this is the topic of the next section.
NORMS
Human infants are born in a world replete with normativity. Thus
from early on, the young learner needs to make sense of human
social interactions in a given cultural context and discern which
actions (e.g., hitting someone else) are generally prohibited or
prescribed (and thus come with binding force or “oughtness”)
and which actions (e.g., petting a dog) are merely idiosyncratic
and thus not subject to norms. But when and how can the young
learner make and understand this distinction? And how do empa-
thy and other-regard interrelate with children’s developing norm
psychology? In what follows we will ﬁrst describe some impor-
tant theoretical and conceptual aspects of social norms and then
look at evidence suggesting that even young children have a robust
understanding of social norms.
There are many different ways to describe social norms, but
perhaps the most crucial features are their binding force – that is,
people “should” or “ought to” perform certain actions in certain
contexts, thus have reason to act in certain ways (Searle, 2001) –
and their generality – that is, norms apply to all participants of a
social practice alike (Nagel, 1970). Thus, we have normative expec-
tations about how people ought to act in certain situations in our
cultural group (Chudek and Henrich, 2011). An important con-
sequence is that social norms help and even urge us to align with
our group members, and so they are essential to social order – at
least by making others’ behavior more predictable, albeit not nec-
essarily more cooperative or moral (Elster, 1989). For example,
codes of honor or dress norms (e.g., wearing ties at ofﬁce) need
not make people more cooperative, but one can predict what is
likely to happen in a certain situation. Moreover, there are many
conﬂicting norms, for example, about how to allocate resources in
a society (e.g., in egalitarian vs. utilitarian ways), and these con-
ﬂicting norms are frequently obstacles to compromise at different
levels within a society. Here, we suggest, is the important role
of human other-regard and empathetic competencies in both the
ontogeny and phylogeny of human norm psychology and moral-
ity. But before examining the interrelations between other-regard,
empathy, and normativity, we ﬁrst need to know what young chil-
dren actually understand about social norms as entities that come
with binding force and generality – not least because morality is
essentially based on norms (Piaget, 1932).
NORMATIVE FORCE AND GENERALITY
There is a rich literature on children’s moral knowledge – starting
with Piaget’s (1932) pioneering work – that is, their judgment
of norm transgressions in hypothetical scenarios, suggesting that
by 3–4 years of age, children make robust distinctions between
existing conventional norms (e.g., proper classroombehavior) and
existing moral norms (e.g., the prohibition to hit someone else).
In particular children have been repeatedly shown to categorize
moral transgressions as more severe, less dependent on context,
less contingent on authority, and more deserving of punishment
than conventional violations (Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983; Killen
and Smetana, 2006; Killen and Rutland, 2011).
The focus here, however, is on children’s normative judgment
in action, that is, on their understanding of the force and the
generality of norms in social interactions. The reason for this is
twofold. First, normativity is fundamentally about human actions
and therefore about practical norms that give people (normative)
reasons to act in certainways (distinct from reasons to think in cer-
tain ways; Wallace, 2011); thus, the question of whether children
understand the force and generality of norms can be answered best
by assessing whether they, as unaffected observers, demand from
third parties to act in certain (prescribed) ways3. Second, look-
ing through an evolutionary lens, it is primarily “adaptive” social
actions that are relevant for natural selection (Vaish andTomasello,
2014) such that some kind of coordinative, cooperative, and moral
behaviors made some hominin ancestors, or groups, more suc-
cessful than others (Alexander, 1987; Krebs, 2008; Tomasello et al.,
2012). In what follows, we will look at children’s enforcement of
conventional and moral norms and the importance of these types
of norms for processes of alignment.
CONVENTIONAL NORMS
We live in a world of traditions, customs, and existing social prac-
tices, so it can be easy to forget that norms are essentially socially
constructed facts that could have been different (i.e., they are arbi-
trary). We typically follow conventional norms and this leads to
alignment with one’s group. For instance, we drive on a particular
side of the street, dress in certain ways in certain contexts, or greet
each other in certain ways. However, mere norm adherence does
not tell us whether individuals are committed to the norms or
just intend to avoid sanctions. Enforcing (often arbitrary) conven-
tional norms as an unaffected observer, however, not only fosters
3This is not to say that there is not a close link between moral knowledge and moral
action or using one’s moral knowledge (but see Blasi, 1983, for the intricacy of this
relation).
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group-wide alignment, but also entails some “impersonal proso-
ciality” on the part of the enforcing group member as it indicates
that the individual cares about the group’s values andways of doing
things per se, not just about whether they serve the self (Rossano,
2012; Schmidt and Tomasello, 2012). Hence, our understanding
of the development of prosocial behavior can be greatly enriched
by our understanding of the emergence of conventional norm
enforcement.
A recent line of research has used an action-based approach to
assess children’s normative understanding. Investigators put chil-
dren into social situations in which different types of third-party
norm transgressions occurred (typically committed by puppets).
Thus, it was possible to examine children’s understanding of the
force and the generality of norms by dint of their spontaneous
(verbal and behavioral) interventions against norm transgressors.
This line of research has found that by 2–3 years of age, children
criticize and protest conventional norm violations, for instance,
when third parties break the rules of a simple game; in particular,
3-year-olds often use normative language (e.g., “This is how it is
done!”) when reprimanding others (Rakoczy et al., 2008). More-
over, children preferentially enforce novel conventional norms
they learn from adults rather than from peers, and from reliable
versus unreliable models (Rakoczy et al., 2009, 2010). Interest-
ingly, young children do not need explicit teaching, ostensive cues
(Gergely and Csibra, 2006; Csibra and Gergely, 2009, 2011), or
normative language by the model to infer that an act is normative
and culturally relevant: Schmidt et al. (2011) found that 3-year-
old children learn novel conventional norms by mere incidental
observation of a conﬁdent adult that does not perform a game-like
action for the child’s beneﬁt. Hence, young children are not only
adept at following conventional norms, they even enforce them
when third parties transgress, thus providing evidence for an early
impersonal prosociality.
MORAL NORMS
Alignment with group members occurs not only by means of con-
ventional norms but also moral norms (e.g., against harming one
another),manyof whichhelp sustainhumancooperation and sup-
press individuals’ self-interest (Joyce, 2006; Krebs, 2008). As with
conventions, groupmembersnot only follow thesenorms, but they
also enforce them against third-party transgressors. On a func-
tional level, enforcement of such norms is considered prosocial
or costly because the enforcer provides the group with a ben-
eﬁt but risks retaliation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Kurzban
et al., 2007). Some norms (often considered moral) carry more
normative weight than others – that is, some violations cause
particularly strong emotional reactions in unaffected observers
(Nichols, 2004a; Rossano, 2012). And the normative weight of a
given norm is adjusted by other-regard and empathy (observers
need to be moved at all by some action), and by the collectivistic
and normative understanding (e.g., “One should not harm oth-
ers”) that feeds back into the process and reinforces other-regard
and emotional reactions to norm violations in a cultural context.
Recent work has found that by 3 years of age, children protest
violations of moral norms, such as those against destroying or
throwing away others’ property (Vaish et al., 2010b; Rossano et al.,
2011). Preschool-aged children also direct less helping toward
harmful individuals and prefer (verbal) punishment to be directed
at immoral individuals rather than at victims (Vaish et al., 2010a;
Kenward and Dahl, 2011; Kenward and Östh, 2012). Another
recent study shows that 3- and5-year-old childrenwill punishpup-
pets that violate a moral norm (theft) by making the stolen object
inaccessible to all individuals, or restoring them to the original
owner when that option exists (Riedl et al., in preparation).
Typically, moral norms are considered wide in scope and thus
applicable to virtually all people (Turiel, 1983; Korsgaard, 1996;
Scanlon, 1998), whereas conventional norms are narrow in scope
and thus applicable only to those who (implicitly or explicitly)
agreed on them (Searle, 1995; Diesendruck and Markson, 2011).
The nature of this distinction is highly debated, with some arguing
for a categorical divide and conceptually distinct domains (Turiel,
1983) and others suggesting a distinction between norms accom-
panied by strong feelings (e.g., norms prohibiting harm, but also
disgusting actions) and norms without or with less emotional
involvement (Haidt et al., 1993; Nichols, 2002, 2004b; Kelly et al.,
2007). What is clear, however, is that moral and conventional
norms are distinct along at least some dimensions.
Indeed, a wealth of interview studies have shown that chil-
dren and adults show systematically different response signatures
when confronted with hypothetical vignettes about paradig-
matic moral versus paradigmatic conventional norm violations
(Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983; Tisak and Jankowski, 1996; Turiel,
2002, 2006). Most importantly, moral transgressions are catego-
rized as more severe, more deserving of punishment, and less
contingent on authority or context. But how do young children
understand the scope of moral versus conventional norms? Who
ought to follow these norms – any third party or ingroup mem-
bers only? A recent study investigated this question and found
that 3-year-olds show systematically different patterns of norm
enforcement in response to violations of paradigmatic conven-
tional and moral norms: Children protested violations of moral
norms (against destroying another’s property without any obvi-
ous reason) equally for ingroup and outgroup individuals, but
they enforced conventional norms (about simple game rules) for
ingroup members only (Schmidt et al., 2012). Thus, children rec-
ognized that conventional norms are group-speciﬁc in nature and
therefore apply only to ingroup members who can be expected to
respect them.
The space of morality, however, is not conﬁned to people
having obligations to perform or refrain from certain acts. Peo-
ple also have rights that are mutually recognized (Turiel, 1983;
Helwig, 1997; Killen and Smetana, 2006). And the key feature of
a right or entitlement is that they are inherently linked to obliga-
tions by others and hence create normative constraints on others’
conduct (Rainbolt, 2006; Searle, 2010):When some right-holder R
is entitled to do something (e.g., to use someone’s property), then
others are obligated not to interfere with R’s entitlement. A recent
study examined young children’s understanding of rights in differ-
ent contexts and found that 3-year-olds, as unaffected observers,
enforce and defend a right-holder’s legitimate entitlements (e.g.,
being granted permission to use an object by the owner of that
object) against someone who threatened the right-holder’s enti-
tlements, for instance, by taking away an object (Schmidt et al.,
2013).
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Fairness – for instance the principle of equality – is par-
ticularly important in discussions of conventional and moral
norms (Rawls, 2001) and has long been a topic of interest in
the study of moral development focusing on distributive justice
(Piaget, 1932; Hook and Cook, 1979). Expectations about fairness
appear early in development and may be linked to prosociality.
For instance, Schmidt and Sommerville (2011) found that 15-
month-old infants expect resources to be distributed equally, and
importantly, that these third-party expectations are closely linked
to infants’ own other-regarding sharing behavior: Infants who
share altruistically (part with a toy they prefer) are more con-
cerned about fairness than infants who share selﬁshly (part with
a toy they do not prefer). This interrelation between fairness and
other-regard was found for costly sharing behaviors in 12- and 15-
month-old infants, but not for prima facie less costly instrumental
and informational helping behaviors (Sommerville et al., 2013).
The ultimatum game is the most widely used tool for prob-
ing fairness preferences in adults (Güth et al., 1982). In this game,
one “player,” the proposer, has an endowment that can be shared
with the second player, the responder. If the responder accepts the
offer, both get the proposed division, but if he or she rejects it –
out of a sense of perceived unfairness – both get nothing. Four-
year-olds make fair offers in response to the threat of rejection
(Takagishi et al., 2010) and this strategic decision-making contin-
ues to improve between 6 and 14 years (Steinbeis et al., 2012). Of
particular importance is the rejection of unfair offers due to disad-
vantageous inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006). Five-year-old children do reject unfair
offers in a reduced form “mini” ultimatum game in which there
are paired choices (e.g., 50/50 vs. 80/20). Unlike adults (Falk et al.,
2003), however, the children do not show sensitivity to outcomes,
nor even to the intentions of the proposer, but rather attend to
a particular sharing norm, namely that parity constitutes fairness
(Wittig et al., 2013). The details of what constitutes a fair offer
is not universal – offers of 50% are not found in all cultures, and
people in different cultures do not always punish offers that depart
from this (e.g., Henrich et al., 2006). However, in ultimatum game
studies, children will punish personally unfair offers (disadvanta-
geous inequity aversion), even though it is costly to do so (for other
examples, see also Murnighan and Saxon, 1998; Bereby-Meyer
and Fiks, 2012). Surprisingly little is known about how children
in different societies understand fairness (e.g., Rochat et al., 2009;
Zebian and Rochat, 2012; House et al., 2013)4.
In sum, the research reviewed here suggests that young chil-
dren are highly motivated to seek out social norms, to acquire
them, and perhaps most importantly, to enforce them as unaf-
fected observers. They apply both the normative force and the
generality of norms. Still, they make important distinctions and
apply norms selectively depending on context and scope. And
so they also appreciate the conventionality of many norms (e.g.,
the group-speciﬁcity of conventional norms). Young children’s
normative learning is guided by rational principles as they take
4Chimpanzees and bonobos do not reject unfair offers when tested with the ulti-
matum game (Jensen et al., 2007a; Kaiser et al., 2012; Proctor et al., 2013), though
some non-human primates sometimes reject food when a partner receives better
(Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; though see, for example, Bräuer et al., 2009).
into account social-pragmatic and contextual cues (e.g., they pref-
erentially learn from competent models). Hence, these ﬁndings
from diverse domains of normativity suggest that young children
already have a basic understanding of important properties of our
normative reality.
LEARNING NORMS
In children, normative learning most likely capitalizes on early
infant–caregiver interactions, including ritualized behaviors, shar-
ing affective states in joint activities, and reciprocal imitation
(Tomasello et al., 2005; Rochat, 2007; Rossano,2012). Importantly,
infants and young children can also use second- and third-party
emotional appraisal (i.e., external sanctions and reward) as a
compass for what others (their culture) understand as norma-
tive. For instance, a caregiver might show a strong emotional
response when one child hits another (Smetana, 2006). However,
the young learner actively makes sense of these situations with
capacities for other-regard, empathy, and normativity, so this is
not a unidirectional process of cultural–emotional conditioning
(Prinz, 2007), but an interaction of the child’s predispositions
(i.e., empathic concern and norm psychology) and the respective
normative-cultural context (Turiel, 1998; Smetana, 2006).
Once children have aligned with their group and internal-
ized the group’s norms, they may also apply personal emotional
appraisal (i.e., internal sanctions or reward) such that they may
even judge their own transgressions negatively and punish them-
selves through guilt and shame, and may reward themselves for
having lived up to a social norm via pride (e.g., Zahn-Waxler and
Kochanska, 1990; Barrett et al., 1993; Tangney et al., 2007). Such
emotions are important for self-regulation, serve as motivations
to act normatively in the future (Kochanska and Aksan, 2006),
and help children follow the norms of the group more gener-
ally. (It remains to be seen whether other animals, great apes in
particular, experience self-conscious emotions; dogs will show an
anticipation of punishment that can be confusedwith – but is not –
guilt; Horowitz, 2009.) Beyond experiencing self-conscious emo-
tions such as guilt, young children also show a preference for and
distribute more resources to transgressors who display guilt than
those who display no guilt, suggesting they understand the impor-
tant appeasement functions that guilt serves after norm violations
(Keltner and Anderson, 2000; Vaish et al., 2011). It is important
to note here that although third-party and personal emotional
appraisals are a vital aspect of normativity, they can only explain
children’s adherence to norms, not their motivation for enforcing
norms, since these require the alignment mechanisms based on
other-regard and empathy discussed above.
THE EVOLUTION OF NORMS
The important evolutionary question is when in human history
did the key mechanisms for normativity – namely their binding
force and generality – evolve. At present, there is no evidence
that primates have anything resembling norms. They do follow
sanction-based “rules” in their groups, such as “subordinate indi-
viduals do not take food away from dominants,” but there is
nothing binding or general about these. Individual learning and
fear of retaliation is sufﬁcient. Primates have been said to have a
“respect for possession” in which dominant individuals will not
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take food from subordinates (Kummer and Cords, 1991), but this
is, of course, not a normative notion, and a rather crude analogy
to the normative institution of ownership in humans. In chim-
panzees, for instance, subordinates will vocalize loudly in response
to food theft, calling the attention of the group, which might chase
or threaten the food “thief.”
There has been some suggestion that some individuals (dom-
inants) in non-human primates will “police” their social groups
by intervening in ﬁghts (Flack et al., 2006; von Rohr et al., 2012).
However, in the only experimental test of third-party punishment,
dominant chimpanzees did not punish a third-party “violation” –
namely one individual taking food – even when the “victim” was
genetically related to the impartial observer and the observer was
dominant to the “thief” (Riedl et al., 2012)—even though they
did “punish” by collapsing a food table when their own food
was taken (Jensen et al., 2007b). Any policing or punishment in
non-human primates and other animals does not need to appeal
to normativity or impersonal group concerns. Yet, despite this,
groups of animals, including chimpanzees, can exhibit regional
differences in behavior – traditions – that some authors refer
to as cultures (e.g., Whiten et al., 1999). They do learn socially
from their groupmates in a way that might support the emer-
gence of culture, or something akin to culture (e.g., Horner
et al., 2006; Hopper et al., 2011; van de Waal et al., 2013), but
there is considerable debate as to whether social learning is even
necessary (e.g., Tennie et al., 2009; Langergraber et al., 2010).
Chimpanzees and other non-human primates, then, might not
have the evolutionarily more recent elements for normativity,
but they have some capacity for social learning that is certainly
essential. When and how the key elements of normativity evolved
remains an open question (for one possibility, see Tomasello et al.,
2012).
DISCUSSION
We have argued that two forms of social alignment – alignment
with other individuals (interpersonally) and with the group
(impersonally) – form thebases for humanmorality andprosocial-
ity. We align ourselves with other individuals by way of empathy
and other-regarding concerns, especially empathic concern, which
allow us to feel with and for others. And we align ourselves with
the group by way of normativity. These two forms of alignment
are intricately linked, and they together give rise to uniquely
human forms of prosociality and cooperation, both at a small
scale, namely families and tribes, and at a large scale in groups
of unrelated strangers. Empathy, other-regarding concerns, and
norms lead to alignment, and group-wide alignment on interper-
sonal and impersonal levels is not merely an outcome, but also
feeds onto individual human psychology. This, in turn, changes
the social dynamics of human group life (in stark contrast to, say,
chimpanzee group life). Though some other species – in particular
the great apes – might align themselves interpersonally with other
individuals via affective resonance, they might not be able to do so
via empathic and other other-regarding concerns, and there is no
evidence to suggest that they align themselves impersonally with
the group via normativity. Human ultrasociality evolved, but it is
not yet clear when in our history we displayed the ﬁrst signs of our
“better nature.”
To further ourunderstandingof thedevelopment and evolution
of ultrasociality, future work will need to examine these alignment
processes in more depth. The work on the origins of other-regard,
for instance, is rather limited. Among children, studies are only
now emerging that show that young children genuinely care about
the welfare of others (Hepach et al., 2012a, 2013), and this work
has only explored simple instrumental helping situations.Whether
such other-regard is present across diverse prosocial contexts and
when it emerges in development are vital questions to answer if we
are to understand the nature of this fundamental alignment pro-
cess. Equally, it is important to explore this process in the other
great apes using a similar method as with children, which will help
establish whether the uniqueness of human ultrasociality stems
from this most basic alignment mechanism. Much more work
is also needed to establish the role (or lack thereof) of empathy
and empathic concern in the prosocial behavior of the great apes.
Althoughwe know a great deal about empathic processes in infants
and young children, systematic investigations with the great apes
are severely lacking, and the little work that exists, though sugges-
tive, is open to alternative interpretations (e.g., Liebal et al., 2014).
As more evidence emerges, the picture of the interpersonal align-
ment processes in humans and other species will become clearer
and will help shape further hypotheses about the shared versus
unique aspects of human prosociality.
How empathic, other-regarding, and normative capacities
evolved – whether together or independently – is also an open
question. We suggest that they are mutually dependent both in
ontogeny and in phylogeny. Young children care a lot about oth-
ers in interpersonal and impersonal (i.e., third-party normative)
interactions, and they care about norms for the norms’ sake –
most clearly evidenced by their enforcement of totally arbitrary
conventional norms, such as game rules (Schmidt and Tomasello,
2012). Most generally, other-regarding concerns and empathy help
humans cooperate in such a way as to create, learn, understand,
and maintain norms. In turn, norms help to structure and deter-
mine contexts in which other-regarding behavior and empathic
concern occur.
The capacities for empathy andother-regardmake itmore likely
for some norms to emerge and to persist. These are, for exam-
ple, norms that have to do with cooperation, such as norms of
reciprocity, norms against harm, norms regarding justice (e.g.,
in resource distribution) and the like. For these norms, sup-
pression of self-interest and some concern for other conspeciﬁcs’
welfare is crucial. Thus, children’s early other-regard and empathy
are morally relevant in the sense that they help them learn and
understand cooperative norms, and to be motivated to follow and
enforce these norms. The direction of this process is from interper-
sonal (other-regard, empathy) to impersonal (normativity). One
consequence of this process would be that human infants acquire
norms of distributive justice (in particular fairness as equality)
early because of their concern for others’well-being and their early
ﬁrst-party and third-party experiencewith fairness situations (e.g.,
desiring resources oneself and observing others desiring resources;
see Geraci and Surian, 2011; Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011).
Other-regard and empathy also have an impersonal dimen-
sion. They help the young child to identify with the group and
to be emotionally committed to the group’s values and norms
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(Tomasello, 2009; Rossano, 2012; Schmidt and Tomasello, 2012).
This then strengthensmotivations to care about the group’s norms
and thus not only to follow them, but also to defend and enforce
them in interpersonal and impersonal interactions. Importantly,
this impersonal dimension not only leads to punitive behaviors
for norm violations, but also constructively fosters conformity,
for instance, by teaching others the group norms. One key point
here is that the norms apply to the group. What constitutes a
group can be arbitrary. For instance, in the classical “minimal
group paradigm,” group assignation such as preference for certain
artists, can lead to in-group favoritism (Tajfel et al., 1971). In addi-
tion to increased cooperation within an arbitrarily created group,
it can also lead to increased punishment of norm violations within
the group, but not across groups (Shinada et al., 2004; Bernhard
et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006). Parochialismhas also been demon-
strated in children on the basis of which school class they belong
to (Fehr et al., 2008). It would seem that the general direction of
this process is from the impersonal to the interpersonal, and chil-
dren’s propensity to enforce different types of norms in different
contexts is paradigmatic of this process.
Norms go far in shaping which behaviors are appropriate in
which contexts, and moral norms (in particular those related to
harm) have special normative weight. Even so, there can be norms
for everything, and conduct rules for helping others and prevent-
ing harm are not universal. The foundations for uniquely human
ultrasociality thus comes from the combination of an emotional,
possibly innate, sensitivity to the needs of others, coupled with a
motivation toward their welfare. Norms systematize, standardize,
and contextualize for the group which prosocial (or antisocial)
behaviors are expected, when, and toward whom.
To explore the role alignment plays in interpersonal and nor-
mative behavior, future studies can pit these alignment processes –
alignment with an individual versus a group – against each other
to see how children resolve them. For instance, there may be
situations in which empathic concern is likely to motivate one
course of action whereas social norms might prescribe another.
As another example, norms for how one ought to behave toward
ingroup members as opposed to members of other groups can
come into conﬂict (see also Killen and Rutland, 2011), especially
when what constitutes a group is ﬂuid (an ingroup member can
be anyone from a child’s class, but can also be anyone of the
same gender regardless of which class he or she is in). Impor-
tantly, these research questions would need to be applied across
various cultures to explore the importance of norms for interper-
sonal alignment. While it would not be possible to test norms in
non-human animals in the same way as in children, it would be
worth investigating whether other species are sensitive to individ-
uals who alignwith others or the group and thosewho donot, such
as by pursuing self-interests ahead of those of others. This work
could be done on our closest living relatives, as well as by com-
paring species that have complex social interactions versus those
that do not (e.g., wolves vs. foxes) or cooperative breeders and
non-cooperative breeders (e.g., meerkats vs. banded mongooses).
Future work could also explore how sensitive individuals are to
cues of alignment fromothers. For example, if another child shows
a concerned look for a child (or a third party), or signs of shared
joy, a child who is sensitive to interpersonal alignment should be
more likely to engage in mutualistic or prosocial acts toward that
person than toward someone who shows no emotional cues of
alignment, or shows signs of misalignment. Whether other species
even have the appropriate signals is an open question. Certainly
dog owners will recognize concerned looks in their dogs; it is not
clear whether dogs would also recognize and use these looks to cue
alignment.
It is possible thatmutualistic, coordinated interactions – among
interdependent individuals – explain the ﬁrst step toward ultraso-
ciality, followed then by inter-group competition, which led to
the formation of norms (Tomasello et al., 2012). We suspect
that the core elements for ultrasociality arose ﬁrst in small-scale,
interdependent interactions, such as dyads (face-to-face and two
individuals in a collaborative activity) and in small groups (e.g.,
observing two people interacting). These small-scale interactions
were greatly facilitated by, and thus gave rise to, the ability for
individuals to align their emotions (empathy), as well as their
goals (joint intentionality; e.g., Tomasello et al., 2005), and precur-
sors of generic codes of behavior (more local norms) could arise
from these. Once the capacities allowing individuals to align with
each other have evolved (and developed), group-level alignment
(e.g., parochialism, common values and ways of doing things)
can evolve, potentially as a result of pressures such as inter-group
competition and cultural group-selection (Boyd and Richerson,
2002; Henrich, 2004). This account of alignment with others via
empathy and other-regarding concerns, as well as an alignment
with the group via normativity, can provide a fresh perspective on
and thus contribute importantly to our understanding of humans’
ultrasociality.
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